Space Station Sunday: Spacewalk This Way

Good afternoon, space fans!  As usual, a host of interesting activities were underway this week, 260 miles above the Earth.

The supertyphoon Vongfong, which viciously attacked Japan this week, stood out starkly from the standpoint of the ISS.  According to rt.com, Vongfong (which has since been downgraded to a tropical storm) was serious enough to warrant evacuations after German astronaut Alexander Gerst's overhead photos of it hit Twitter.  US astronaut Reid Wiseman also commented on the phenomena, telling his Twitter followers, "I’ve seen many {storms} from here, but none like this."

According to NASA.gov, Tuesday's spacewalk (or "EVA" - extravehicular activity) was executed excellently by astronauts Wiseman and Gerst.  They completed a 6 hour, 13 minute EVA to accomplish the relocation of a failed cooling pump, the integration of a new power source for the station's mobile platform for exterior machinery, and the repair of a light source for one of the station's exterior cameras (the light will be worked on inside the station and replaced during an upcoming spacewalk.)  Gerst used the Canadarm, an extending robotic arm on the exterior of the station, to ride to his worksite.  The astronauts were so successful and efficient in their mission that they had a few extra minutes to score some cool pictures.  All objectives for this EVA were met to satisfaction.

Astronaut Gerst, hanging out with the Canadarm outside the ISS.  The module to the upper left is a SpaceX Dragon.



Wiseman gets to rally for round two this Wednesday, when he and fellow US astronaut Butch Wilmore will be floating out to replace the repaired television camera light, and also to replace a sequential shunt unit that is critical for powering the station. In the meantime, Wiseman and Wilmore have been working on the Cardio Ox experiment, which uses ultrasound to assess cardiovascular benefits and hindrances in low gravity. These discoveries may aid heart and artery research (particularly regarding stress and atherosclerosis) on earth, as well as for future spaceflight.

A third spacewalk, this time manned by two Russian cosmonauts, is slated for October 22nd. Cosmonauts Alexander Samokutyaev and Max Suraev will head out to photograph the Russian side of the space station and jettison obsolete space gear.

Holding down the space-fort, cosmonaut Elena Serova monitored air quality in the ISS using the Matryoshka experiment, which assesses radiation impact on the inside of the station via a mannequin equipped with human tissue simulators.  Despite high energy neutrons and other forms of radiation bombarding the station, the astronauts are still within the acceptable dosage of radiation tolerance.

Speaking of things swooping through the sky, if you ever wondered whether a shooting star just might be the space station, there's an easy way to find out!  You can learn all the details at NASA's Spot The Station website, and follow or submit amazing space station-spotter images at #SpotTheStation.  Everything from long-exposure shots to silhouettes showcase the ISS in all of its orbiting glory.

So until next week, keep your eyes on our guys in the skies...then watch this space!

(Sun)spot the station?
(Image info.)


All Ears: New "Smart Earrings" Indicate Your Bio-stats

Earrings are not just for ornamentation anymore.  Thanks to a new invention called the Ear-O-Smart, your earlobes will be able to feed information to your brain lobes.

According to earosmart.com, the jewelry-esque devices can monitor your heart rate, calorie burn, and overall activity level.  The dime-sized multifaceted white earrings interact with your smart phone to casually keep you posted about your fitness stats throughout the day.

The device, which is currently seeking funding on kickstarter, promises to help you "make healthy choices" thanks to its feedback.  Could a line of intelligent jewelry be fancy in the future?

It's only a matter of time before you can plug into your brain via gauged plugs.
(Image courtesy piercingtime.com.)

Thync Before You Act: New Wearable Device To Assess And Regulate Mental States

If you thought putting on your headphones and turning up some good tunes was the best way to improve your mood for the day, you might be interested in the latest cutting-edge, life-lifting wearable technology.

According to iamwire.com, the new device "Thync" has received $17 million in funding and is set to launch next year.  It is a wearable device which focuses on certain neural pathways to improve various elements of the user's perception.  Neurosignaling algorithms generate responses in the brain that improve one's focus, energy, and even calmness.

Samir Kaul, a partner at Thync's start-up financers, Khosla Ventures, explained, “We back the talented team at Thync because we see a revolutionary convergence at the intersection of neuroscience and consumer technology."

Other wearable emotion-detectors/mind-readers such as Emotiv's "Neuro-Headset" are also at the forefront of this revolution. In 2015, it is estimated that some 300 million wearables will be in the hands and brains of consumers.

It's your coffee, Ritalin, and Vicodin, all in one handy zap to your brainframe!

Don't Mess With Texas's Ebola-Killing Robot

It's like the Terminator...for the Ebola virus.

In light of the United States appearance of Africa's Least Wanted menace, a robot that can kill the Ebola virus using UV light has hit the market.  As reported by wtsp.com, the robot known as "Little Moe" sanitizes possible outbreak locations by blasting UV light to fuse and thus destroy the virus's DNA.  A xenon bulb flashes at 1.5 times per second - enough to clean a whole hospital room in five minutes, or to scrub an Ebola-tainted surface in two minutes.

The robot, developed by the Texas company Xenex, is now a feature of 250 hospitals nationwide.  Dr. Mark Stibich, who works with Xenex, explained, "...What our customers have seen and reported in the medical literature is reduction in these infections in the rate of up to 50 percent."

Shine on, Little Moe.

It also serves as party lighting for your "I Survived Ebola" celebration bash...if you make it.

Grazing In The Nanograss Is A Gas: New "Nanopillars" To Improve Solar Cells

Sometimes when science takes a page from nature, great ideas abound.  Such is the case with the new "nanograss" design, which improves the energy-gathering capabilities of solar panels.

According to neomatica.com, researchers used the concept of blades of grass to expound on collecting available solar power.  When blades of grass grow, their surface area is multiplied by their height, and their vertical growing pattern makes it easy to have a large number of blades in a small area.  This makes for an accrued larger surface area that can absorb (and, in turn, convert) more sunlight when the design is applied to solar panels.

The new "nanograss" is created from nano-crystalline material with photovoltaic capacity.  On the atomic scale, at billionths of a meter tall, the cell stacks or "nanopillars" appear similar to a neatly-trimmed lawn of grass.  Each blade is a column of semiconductor p-n junctions which react with 32% more efficiency than traditional thin-film photovoltaic cells.

Professor Briseno of UMass Amherst, the lead author of the study, claims, “This work is a major advancement in the field of organic solar cells because we have developed what the field considers the ‘Holy Grail’ architecture for harvesting light and converting it to electricity.”

The biggest challenge of the project was to enable the molecules to stack vertically so that their electrons could flow as needed, bearing charge in only one direction. The substrate grapheme was found to be the solution that allowed the molecules to stack properly, bringing the idea to actualization. The results may soon be used in batteries and transistors as well as solar cells.

Of course, nano-pranks were quick to follow on the nano-lawn.
(Image courtesy umass.edu.)



Hack Lab Intro: How to Set up a Home Hacking and Security Testing Lab

Introduction

This series of articles comprises an introductory tutorial on how to set up a home lab to experiment with common hacking and information security testing tools. Our setup will  allow us to explore the sorts of computer and network vulnerabilities that can be encountered on the internet, and to test the security of our own home computer network and networked devices, all from within an isolated and secure working environment. The series is geared toward individuals who have little or no prior experience with virtualization software or common hacking and security testing tools, but are interested in exploring network and computer security.

Over the course of the tutorial series, we will create two separate network configurations. The first will be a completely virtual environment populated by two virtual guest systems running inside a single host computer. This requires nothing more than an internet connection for the necessary downloads, and a computer with relatively modest RAM and disk resources.

The second configuration will be an everyday local area network of the sort that can be found in many homes, but which is isolated from the internet and where we can strictly control and monitor all network traffic. This setup is slightly more involved in terms of hardware than the first, requiring also a spare router.

Our monitoring and attack system in both configurations will be an instance of a Kali Linux virtual machine running inside an installation of the VirtualBox software package on our primary computer. Kali is a Linux operating system distribution intended for security testing and digital forensics.

In the first completely virtual network environment, our victim will be an instance of  Metasploitable2, a virtual machine that exhibits vulnerabilities that can be found on  everyday computer systems and software configurations. As noted at Offensive Security, "Metasploitable is an intentionally vulnerable Linux virtual machine. This VM can be used to conduct security training, test security tools, and practice common penetration testing techniques."

In the second network configuration, we will use the Kali Linux virtual machine to compromise an everyday local area network router of the sort that can be found on many home networks, in order to demonstrate just how easy it can be to steal login credentials  passed from another computer on the network.

The tutorial is broken down into four parts:
  • Part 1 covers the installation of VirtualBox and provides a walk through of a full installation of a Kali virtual machine on your primary lab computer. Along the way, we'll take a short detour on how to quickly run live Kali sessions without a full installation of the machine.
  • Part 4 provides details on setting up our second network configuration, which models an everyday home local area network. With the attack machine, we'll conduct a simple man-in-the-middle attack against the network's router, and demonstrate a serious security vulnerability by stealing login credentials sent to it from the victim machine, in this case, the host computer. 

Hack Lab Part 4: Compromising a Home Router on a Local Area Network

This is part four in our tutorial series on how to set up a home hacking and security testing lab. In part three, we set up a completely virtual network inside VirtualBox in order to use Kali to test the (in)security of the Metasploitable2 virtual machine. In the present article, we'll set up a local area network similar to one you might find in any home, and then walk through a man-in-the-middle attack against an everyday router.

Here's our hypothetical scenario: there is a malicious individual on a local area network listening in on the network traffic (sniffing it, as they say) using ARP poisoning in an attempt to steal login credentials from the router's administrator so as to hijack the device, and by extension, the network. In this scenario, Kali will once again function as the attacker but the host computer will be the victim.

This configuration will require a router specifically for the purpose of hosting our home lab's local area network. This could also be accomplished virtually, but having the external network will allow us to test the security of other external networked devices moving forward.

Configuring the Local Area Network
For the present test, which was successful, I picked up one of those ubiquitous Netgear WNR 2000 series home routers at a local flea market for ten dollars. You might even have an old router just lying around collecting dust. Plug the router in, turn it on, and configure it as desired. An online manual for this router stated that once you have connected your computer to it, you can navigate to the URL routerlogin.net or the device's ip address in a web browser to log in for administrative purposes. They further provided the factory default login credentials: 'admin' for the login name, and 'password' for the password. The first thing I did upon logging was to change the password using the router's so-called "Smart Wizard".

I prefer to hook up devices to the lab router through ethernet, and turn off wireless networking in the router when I'm feeling paranoid. Log into the router, and adjust settings as necessary. It should have DHCP, to provide ip addresses to hosts on the network. Keep it completely isolated from your actual home LAN that is connected to the internet, at the very least because connecting a second dhcp server to your main home network would cause a fair amount of chaos. We'll soon see whether this sort of interaction with the router is secure in any way. (Spoiler alert: in the case of the WNR 2000, it is not.)

Once your router is setup, open the Network settings in your Kali machine and change the attachment from the internal network to bridged mode, and attach it to the appropriate interface. (People who are more comfortable with managing multiple interfaces on Linux could just add a second adapter and switch between the two inside Kali.)  Under the Advanced section of Kali's Network settings, notice the drop down menu for Promiscuous Mode. This setting is important for our test. There are three options here: Deny, Allow VMs, and Allow All. Set it to Deny. This means that Kali will not be privy to any traffic directly to or from its host machine or other VMs that may be on the network.


Why have we set Promiscuous Mode to Deny?

Abstinence-Only Networking and the IP Stack
When Kali is running in bridged networking mode, so as far as the rest of the hosts on the network are concerned, it is a completely independent host. But it's not, it's a virtual machine, it shares its network interface with its host computer, and by extension with any other VMs that might also access that interface.

If we set promiscuous mode to Allow All, the Kali machine will pick up all traffic going over the network interface, to which it has access because it is itself bridged over this interface. That obviously includes the given network's traffic sent to and from the host computer on which the virtual machine is running, as well as any other virtual machines it might be running on that interface. If the host computer pings the router, Kali will pick up the traffic.

When promiscuous mode is set to Deny, on the other hand, Kali networks with the host computer (and any other virtual machines that might be on the network) as if they were all on completely separate physical devices. If the host computer pings the router, Kali will not pick up the traffic.

If there is a secondary computer on the network, even if Kali is in promiscuous mode, it will not be able to capture a ping from that computer to the router, or any other such traffic between them, for that matter, such as an http session.  

When we run the man-in-the-middle attack against the router and the host machine, however, we'll see that we can pick up traffic between them. One might wonder whether this is a true man-in-the-middle attack, because as we already know, the Kali guest and the host computer share an interface. Kali already has access to the host machine's traffic. Setting up the sniffer is basically just enabling promiscuous mode on the adapter setting.

However, we are not conducting a physical layer attack. ARP poisoning is conducted between the link layer and the network layer of the IP stack. This could be demonstrated with a secondary host on the network. An ARP attack by Kali against the secondary computer will still work even though Kali does not share a physical network interface with the victim, and could not detect such traffic even in promiscuous mode.


Reconnaissance and Scanning the Network
There should now be three hosts on the lab LAN: 1) the router, 2) the host computer (our victim), and 3) the Kali virtual machine (our attacker). Let's begin by conducting some passive monitoring of the network traffic.

Open up Wireshark on your Kali instance and conduct a live capture, to see what kind of traffic you can pick up on this network. (See part two in the series for info on how to properly configure Wireshark to conduct a live capture, if you haven't already.) Let the scan run for about half an hour. My capture picked up:
  • SSDP broadcasts from the router, alerting hosts as to its existence
  • ARP broadcasts from the victim computer and the Kali host machine, seeking out the router's hardware address from its ip address.
  • DNS requests to external websites for services running on Kali and the host machine, these are obviously unresolvable, since the network is not connected to the internet. (I would also like to shut down these services later if they are not system critical, as I don't like the idea of my machines contacting random services on the internet without my say so.)
Nothing really seems out of the ordinary here, so let's run a scan of the network. Here's the topology graphic produced by Zenmap from a default nmap scan of my lab network:


The router is at 192.168.1.1, the primary host computer is at 192.168.1.2 and the Kali machine is at 192.168.1.5. As you can see, Zenmap's color coding indicates that there may be some vulnerabilities in the router.

This scan discovered three open ports on the router, and found no open ports on any of the other hosts. Ports 23 (telnet) and 80 (HTTP) were found open by default on the router. We would expect port 80 to be open since you can log into the router with a web browser for administrative purposes. It seems a bit odd that the telnet port is open as well, as it is unlikely anyone today would be telnetting into the router on their home network. This is a security vulnerability, but, fortunately, this router does not actually allow simple telnet access to its administrative interface. Any basic attempts to connect to it via telnet are rejected, which makes one wonder why it is open to begin with.

Now let's attempt to systematically determine what traffic on the network the Kali instance is able to capture. All packets sent from or to the Kali VM will be captured in Wireshark, since the capture is running on that system: ex. ping requests to the router from Kali, ping requests to Kali from the host computer, HTTP traffic if you use a Kali web browser to navigate to the router's admin page, and so on.

As noted above, if your Kali virtual machine's network settings were in promiscuous mode, Wireshark would also capture any packets directly sent to or from the host computer. But this is not the case here as we have set promiscuous mode to Deny.

With promiscuous mode set to Deny, if you ping Kali from the host computer, the Wireshark capture will pick up all of these packets, since they are being sent directly to and from the Kali machine. However, if you ping the router from the host computer, none of the request or reply packets will be picked up by your Wireshark capture in Kali, nor will any other such traffic. For example, if you use a web browser on the host computer to navigate to the router's login interface, the capture will not detect any of this traffic.

With this observation, we have acquired our target. What we would like to do is two-fold: 1) pick up any direct traffic at all between the host computer and the router, 2) pick up any sensitive traffic (and any correspondingly sensitive information) sent between these devices.

Running a Man-in-the-Middle Attack with Ettercap
To compromise the traffic between the host computer and the router, we are going to use a program called Ettercap. As noted in its manual page, Ettercap is a "multi-purpose sniffer/content filter for man in the middle attacks." Ettercap can be run from the command line or through its graphical interface. To launch the graphical interface, type the following command into a terminal: sudo ettercap -G. The Ettercap graphical interface:


However, we're going to run Ettercap from the command line, as this conserves more resources on the host machine since it does not require excess RAM. Our plan is to use arp poisoning to capture traffic between the victim and the router. Reading through the Ettercap manual pages allows us to determine that we can use the following command to conduct our attack:
sudo ettercap -i eth0 -T -M arp /192.168.1.1/ /192.168.1.2/
Before we run the command, let's take a closer look at what's going on here: 
  1. sudo runs the command as a privileged user. This is necessary for Ettercap to conduct the packet capture.
  2. ettercap tells the shell to run the Ettercap program.
  3. -i eth0 tells Ettercap to run the capture on the eth0 interface inside Kali. This may be different for you depending on how you have your network adapters set up. If you try to run arp poisoning on an interface that is not enabled, Ettercap will likely complain that "No such device exists". If you run it on an interface that is enabled, but not connected to a network, Ettercap will complain that "ARP poisoning needs a non empty hosts list".
  4. -Tq tells Ettercap to run in text mode (-T), meaning it will print out any text characters found in its capture.
  5. -M tells Ettercap to run a man-in-the-middle attack.
  6. arp specifies that Ettercap should run an ARP poisoning man-in-the-middle attack.
  7. /192.168.1.1/ and /192.168.1.2/ specifies the two specific hosts we want to target.
Let's see if we can capture any traffic between the victim and the router. Start a Wireshark live capture on Kali. Now ping the router from your host computer, and just let it ride (ex. ping 192.168.1.1). If you are running in non-promiscuous mode, Kali will not pick up any of the ping requests and replies between the victim and the router.

Now run the Ettercap command above (with any necessary substitutions for your own network configuration) from a terminal in Kali. If successful, the Wireshark capture should now begin picking up the echo requests and replies between the victim and the router (as well as any other packets passing between them), and Ettercap will print to the terminal any text picked up in those packets. You can now stop the live capture, quit Ettercap and stop the ping from the host machine to analyze the results. 

The next question is whether we can pick up any sensitive information, such as login credentials, passing between the victim and the router. For this, we'll slightly modify our Ettercap command:
sudo ettercap -i eth0 -Tq -M arp /192.168.1.1/ /192.168.1.2/
As you can see, everything is the same here, except I've added a q to the -T option. This tells Ettercap to run in quiet mode, which means that it will not print any and all text it picks up in captured packets, but rather only text of potential significance, such as login credentials. For our test, we want to see if we can capture the victim's credentials when logging into the router.

Start a new Wireshark live capture in Kali. Run the Ettercap quiet mode command in a terminal. Now, on the host computer, use a web browser to navigate to the router and log in to the administrative interface. Here's the result in Ettercap when I ran this attack against the WNR 2000 router:


As you can see, Ettercap picked up the victim's user name (here: 'admin') as well as the password (here: 'supersecretstring'). Moreover, the router passed the login credentials over the network in plaintext six times when the victim logged in to the device! Obviously, 'supersecretstring' is not a very good password, but in the present case it doesn't really  matter how secure the password is, since the router passes it over the network in plaintext.  
The login credentials can also be found in the Wireshark packet capture run alongside the Ettercap ARP poisoning attack. My Wireshark capture picked up a lot of packets, so let's do a search for 'credentials':


Inspecting the first packet returned from this search, reveals the following under the HTTP section of the packet view:


And there they are, the user name and password, conveniently located under the authorization heading: 'admin:supersecretstring'.   In fact, it turns out the login credentials are sent in plaintext every time the victim loads another page in the router web interface!

The victim's router admin account has now been compromised. After the victim logs out of the router, the attacker can immediately log in with admin privileges, change the password and lock out the victim, or make changes to the system's settings, turning it off, etc. The "Smart Wizard" on the WNR 2000 router isn't so smart or wizardly after all!

Now the question is: does this attack work against the router on your home lab? Let us know in the comments.

Reflecting on this attack, one would probably ask: Can't we detect this attack as it was going on? Does it not create a whole load of excess traffic on the network? Wouldn't it be clear from a packet capture on the victim machine that the intrusion took place? Wouldn't it even identify the ip and hardware addresses of the attacker? The answer to all those questions is in the affirmative, but you'd need to have been monitoring the network traffic over the whole course of the login session to know that. A simpler solution for the potential victim is to check the system's ARP cache before logging in to the router. This will identify whether there are two hosts on the network with the same hardware address. Since hardware addresses are supposed to be universally unique, this is a tell-tale sign that ARP spoofing is in progress.


Moving Forward
Now that you have your lab's local area network set up, what can you do with it moving forward? Well, that's up to you! At the very least, you can use it to test the security of any given networked device you like, whether it's your main computer, a secondary computer, a cell phone, a tablet, a network drive or fileserver, a television or gaming console, and so on. Do you know what precise information your cell phone or laptop broadcasts to the entire local area network when you connect to any wireless device?

That concludes part four of our tutorial series on setting up a home hacking and security testing lab. If you've followed along from the beginning, you now have a virtual network you can use to explore the vulnerabilities in Metasploitable, an isolated local area network to test the security of any device you wish, and some familiarity with a handful of the many tools that are bundled with Kali.

As always, questions, comments, suggestions and criticism are welcome in the comments. Happy hacking!